Long-Tam Silver lVlining Trends in Spanish America
silver production increased or decreased, by how much, and for what length of time in Spanish America, in ea ch viceroyalty (Peru and Mexico), and in several of the larger mining camps or districts . These calculations show that during the first half of the colonial period (circa 1560-1685) Spanish American mines provided between 25,000 and 30 ,000 tons of silver to th e Atlantic World a nd beyond; during the second h alf , that amount more than doubled. Although the Spani sh American siiver curve does not rise steadily or gradually upward, the "u pwa r d trend always predominat es ."? Since the Spanish colo nial silve r industry helped to drive both the American and European economies, more kn owledge of the secular trends in mining and the factors that influenced those trends would shed furth er light on how the Atlantic econom y performed. Although Peru h ad at Potosi the ri chest silver mining cam p, Mexico boasted two im portant ad va n tages for long-term growth-higher are grades and lower operational costs-that Peru lacked.:' Because of these advantages, merchants , who controlled much of the ca pital market in the New World , had more in centive to invest in expensive rehabilitations of mines in Mexico th an in Peru. But, despite a severe depression in Potosi during the seventeenth century and a more costly a nd less profitable industry throughout Peru , mining did not die out in Potosi or across the viceroyalty. There were bursts of activity, from opening new camps to rehabilitating old ones, throughout the colonial period, a n d in the eighteenth cen tury a n impressive re covery was e nginee red at Potosi and several other camps. Although Potosi did not regain its former preeminence, it remained one of t.he la rgest producing ca m ps in Spanish Am eri ca as late as two centuries after its foundin g. Faced with a low ret.urn per unit of processed ore, Peruvian mining cam e to have a marginal cha racte r, in con tra st to Mexican mining. The survival of th e often cond em n ed draft-labor system (mila) in Peru m ay be explained in part be cause owners co uld pay m ila workers less than voluntary laborers and thereby reduce their operating costs. Mexican miners had to be cost-conscious, too , but with higher profit margins they co uld 'a ttract the long-term financing th at \VOl " crucial to keep the industry h ealthy. Peru, [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] . I have conv e rted all the silver series La pesos on th e basis o f 8 pesos per mark (8 o u nces) o f silver. 2 Pie rr e C ha u n u and Huguette C h a u n u's mas sive stud y, Seville et l'Atlautique (1 501 -1 650).8 vols. (Pa ris. 195 5-.')9 ). co ncerns a co nj u nc ture betw een Europe and the Ne w World in th e sixte enth and sevent ee nt h centuries. A re cent important st udy . ba sed on so u rce s from Holl and, is Marineau. l ncroyables gtucttes 1' 1[abulcux miitaux, 4 2-1 19, 220-350 , The d eb ate ove r the value o f the study o f th e longue duree is treated in Pete r Burke. ed ., Econ omy an d Society in M odem Europe (Londo n, 1972) , especially in Burke's " In tro d uc tion," 1-9. Essay s by Ca rlos C ipo lla (43-46) and Alexandre R. E. C ha be rt (47-54) o ffe r divergent in te r p re tat ions o n the im pa ct of th e flow of silve r to Europe, primarily with reference to Ital y. In se ll in g o u t his diffe re nces with Cipolla over how La de scribe th e pric e movement aft er 1550 in I taly , Chabert ack nowledged cyclical dips but asse rt ed th at "t he upwa rd tr end always predomi nates" (50). The same language, I would a r g ue , co uld d escribe the silver-p ro duction trend in the Spanish New World .
Economics of M exico mill
3 For a wide-rangin g discussion of the mining industry in Peru and Mexi co, see David Brading a nd Ha rr y Cross. "Colonial Silver Min in g: Mexi co and Peru," H isp ani c American H istorical R eview. 52 (197 2): 545-79.
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TOTAL COLONIAL SILVER PRODUCTION 1555-1810
1559-1810: rc = 0.00227141; r = 0.5 %; I = 5 .02 ;?-= 0 .90 ; COlT . 1559-1627: rc = 0.0095536 3; ,. = 2.3 %; I = 4.16; -?-= 0 .92 ; COlT. 1628-1697: l'C = -.00163477; r = -0 .3 %; I = 3.92 ; -r = 0.17 1698-J 810 : rc = 0.00455136; r = 1.I %; I = 10.20; -?-= 0.91; con .
THE TOTAL OUTPUT OF THE SPANISH COLONIAL MINES between the middle of the sixteenth ce n tu r y and the end o f the colonial period reached between 2.9 and 3. 1 billion pesos (each peso of 272 maravedis). That total represents an annual average production of between 11.5 and 13.5 million pesos» The trend line, as shown on rc r eg re ssion coefficient (log) r rate p er yea r Student I statistic ?-coefficient of determin ati on con'. corre cted for autocorrelati on if necessary -,
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Figure 1, yields an annual growth of 0 .6 percent. At that rate, more th an a century would have passed before output doubled. The fact is that output did not rise automatically in steps of one-half of 1 percent per year but instead moved rather erratically up and down . According to the annual production figures, output had risen 300 percent by 1600, dropped a third by 1700, and climbed another 300 percent by 1810. Despite numerous and frequent shifts in direction, which included some sustained declines, the long-term trend in production was unmistakably upward.s Such growth signifies a capacity to overcome recurring problems related to undercapitalization, heavy taxes, and ineptitude. . . ..
"
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1 have divided the long colonial curve into three periods: 1559-1627, ":'; l"
.. t 1628-1697, and 1698-1810 . In the first phase, 1559-1627, the rise in the curve represents a yearly growth of about 2.3 percent. In the seventeenth century from 1628 to 1697, the curve follows a downward course at a n annual rate of 0.3 percent.
r o "
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In the final century of the colonial period , the trend reverses itself, and output grew by 1.1 percent annually. The high growth rate in the first period can be attributed mostly to easy accessibility to the ores and the mid-sixteenth-century invention of the mercury process that made refining medium and low -grade ores, r · · especially Potosi's tailings, profitable. The downturn in production of silver at
I
Potosi was the chief cause of the d eclining curve in the seventeenth century, Also cont ribu tin g to the downturn was a readjustment a nd consolid a tion that inevitably jtook place in the industry as miners had to find the resources to dig deeper sh afts
·r· (
and longer tunnels to reach the ore. Still, halfway through the colonial period, , ; t'"
I
Potosi's share of the total output in Spanish America was large th at it could l -, almost dictate the shape of th e New World silver curve. The third period ca n be des cribed as one o f both revival and expansion throughout Spanish America: not only were old cam ps in both Peru and Mexico being rehabilitated but n ew ones were also being established.
·l :
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In the sixteenth and early seventeenth ce n tur ies, a substa n tial part of the silver I:' · ' · mined in America was exported to Europe. This fact has led som e historians to . 1 1 -contend that th e shipment of treasure from America caused a ;.{ in ftatio n in Europe t'
during the second half of the sixt eenth cen tu ry and th e early seventeenth ce ntu r y.
1.
I hav e used 1810 as the term inal d at e, alt h o ugh mining continued throughout th e insurgency. The impact o f the in surgency on mining is a topic for another inquiry " T o calculate th e regression co efficients. I have used Econpak, d eveloped by Dr. Milton H allberg o f Penn State. Unless followed by a figure in a parentheses. a ll growth ra tes have z-values of a 99 percent confid ence level . I hav e co rrected for autocorrelation whereve r the Durbin statistic does not fall with in a n ac ce p ta ble range . In plotting trend lin es a nd ca lcu lating growth rates , I d o not wish to imply that tim e. as the independent variable. is the only factor th at ex plains p rodu ction, the d ependent variable . How much to produce d epends on many different factors that ca n no t al wa ys be related to time. I ha ve tried in all case s to find the be st fittin g lin e to de scribe ea ch cu rve . In analy zing se g me n ts o f trends, I have used essentially a "d u m my -varia ble" approach. This ha s the effect of trea ting each segment as unconnected with all o th e r segme n ts with no assuran ce th at the points wh ere th e y meet ar e actua lly j oined . My colleague , Dr. Spiro Stefauou, h as been analyzing th e silve r se ries in terms o f linear splines. th at is, a technique that eliminates th e d iscontinuities at the points wh ere th e segments j oin . This allow s fo r th e plotting o f a co ntin uo us line ra ther than a broken -one ; it may al so generate slightly to moderately different growth rates. We will e xam in e these techniques an d th e findings th at th ey yield in a forthcoming manuscript o n Mexico's eighteenth-century econom y. Growth rates a re calculated according to the sta nda rd eq uatio n : PI = Po (1 + r)' , with th e logarithm of the equat ion be ing log PI = log Po + I log (l + T) .
r.,
. ," -,-. ' . ' .
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Other historians d isagr ee, contending that there was not much infl at iona r y impact at all. Scholars have compiled and searched numerous price and production se ries from the Mediterranean to th e Baltic for conclusive evid e nc e of the im p act of the inflation but without reaching any agreement. When the series for total colonial Spanish American silver output is compared with the European series, they follow sim ilar pa th s: th ey rise sha r ply until th e earl y se venteenth ce n tu ry afte r ' wh ich th ey level off and turn d ownwa rd . But the lack of precise information abo u t how much silver was p roduced in Am erica and was exported to Europe has been a h andicap to resolvin g how much inflation there was. I t can now be shown that, up to 1600 or 1610, between 375 million a n d 400 million pesos worth o f silver were produced in th e New World . Nearl y all th e production o f silver occurred in the se cond half of th e sixteenth ce n tu ry , so th e an n ual a ve rage output from 1550 to 1600 or 1610 '"> ,-' was from 6.5 to 7.5 million pesos per yea r . The rate of growth in production of silve r during that half-century meant that output doubled abo u t e ve ry thirty years, a nd
that rate o f gro wth ma y also hold for exports, whi ch co ns titu ted half or more of wh at was produced."
The debat e over the econo mic impact of silver fr om America o n Eu ro pe also concerns the proposition that a slu m p in production o f silver pushed Am erica a n d Europe into a dep ression. A contraction in the Sp anish American silver industry did occ u r, with th e ave ra ge production falli n g by as much as a qu arter co m pa re d to the average for the whole colon ial period. A loss of that magnitude wou ld certainly a ffe ct the economies of Europe and America, although with resp ect to America Peru suffered much mo re th an Mexico. What is important to understand, however, is that th e downturn in total colon ial production was confined primarily to th e second qu arter o f the seventeen th century a nd th at it had bo ttomed out by the third qu arter." The link between New World silver production a n d Old World economic ac tivity had g rown m ore tenuous in part becau se the colon ial economies were less d ependent on Europe. Exportin g less silver to Europe during the sev enteenth ce ntu r y may have se t th e co nd itions for a shorter, milder d epression in Am erica t h an in Europ e." Record p roduction levels, establish ed in the 1610s, ,; F. P. Braud el a nd F. Sp oo ner, "P rices in Eu ro p e from 1450 to 1750," in E. E. Rich a nd C . 7 For a slIrvc}' of th e sta tistica l profil es o f th e Ell ropeon eco no m ies from 1500 to 1800, se c C h a rle s Wilson a n d Geoffrey Pa rk e r, eds ., An Introdu ction to the So urces oj European Economic H istory 1500-1 80 0 (I tha ca, N .Y., 1977 ) .
H 1 h ave not tried here to resolv e the "ce n tu r y of depression" con troversy. Clearly , u ne r e sult of thi s research is th at in ierrus at' mini ng Pe ru ha d a serio us depression a n d Mexico hod a lmost no ne in th e se ven te e nt h ce n tu ry . See Wo od row Bo rah , N ew 5 /)Oin :' Gmtury of Depression (Berkeley , Ca lif., 1951 ), 18-29 ; Bakewe ll, S ilver M iniJJg and Society, 226 -28 ; j ona th an Is rael, " Mex ico and th e 'Ge nera l Crisis' uf th e Se ve nteent h Centur y," P ast a nd Present, 63 (19i4) : 38-39, et passi m; Te Paskc and Kle in , "Seven teen th -Ce n tu ry Crisis," 116-35 , wit h rebuttal s by Hen ry Ka m en and Israel a nd rej o inders by T cf'aske a n d K lei n in PrISt an d Present, 97 ( 1982) : 144-61 : Ric ha rd Bo yer, "Mexico in th e Se venteenth ;',;.-.
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were broken in the 1720s and quickly surpassed again in the 1740s. There were lapses in the steady climb of the production curve during the eighteenth century (early l720s and early 17405) but no serious or prolonged interruptions . These observations about a seventeenth century less depressed and an eighteenth century more expansive than earlier thought point to the conclusion that silver was far more abundant in the Atlantic World than has heretofore been appreciated."
Peru's curve closely resembles the curve for total colonial production but with some important distinctions (see Figure 2) . For the whole colonial period, the trend line is almost flat , with an annual growth rate of only 0.1 percent (98 percent confidence level) . The shifts within the secular movement are fairly dramatic. The early successes at Peru were spectacular. Climbing at an annual rate of 3.6 percent, output doubled about every twenty years. By 1610 (half a century later), the rise had peaked, and a contraction had begun. Production fell at a rate of 1.7 percent per year until 1715. So great was the fall that output in the early eighteenth century was not much higher than it had been in the middle of the sixteenth century. But, severe as the contraction was, it did not extinguish mining activity. In almost every decade between 1630 and 1690, production shot up for a year or two only to lapse once again. Until the eighteenth century, none of these spurts was powerful enough to bring about a permanent recovery. After the long descent of the seventeenth century, Peruvian mining made an impressive recovery, growing at an annual rate of 1.2 percent during the eighteenth century. Despite this strong performance, the record output of the early seventeenth century was not surpassed until the 17805. In the following two decades, at least until 1810, production turned downward again.
Mexico's silver curve differs significantly from Peru's . From the second half of . the sixteenth century to 1810, Mexican output followed a much stronger upward course at 1 percent per year, ten times the rate for Peru (see Figure 3) . To be sure, the Mexican curve turned down during the second quarter of seventeenth cen tury and again during the second quarter of the eighteenth century. These were Century: Transition o f a Colonial Society," Hispanic American Historical Review, 57 (1977) !I Two factors-contraband trade in silver bullion and missing ledgers-s-can affect thc shape of the curve in an}' centur}' but bear most directly on the seventeenth century. Illicit commerce certainly Hourished in seventecuth-century Peru, but neither the extent ofsuch commerce nor whether the silver involved was registered or unregistered is ye; well understood. Unregistered silver would not appcal' in the ueasury ledgers and, therefore, would not be counted. Moreover, not all the known treasury ledgers have becn consulted. Ifsome of the gaps in the seventeenth-century treasury series should ever be (1I1ed, the sevenrcenth-century contraction rna}' become less pronounced. There is the possibility that future research will alter the appearancc of the curve in the sixteenth a nd eighteenth centuries, 100. Morineau, Incroyablcs ga zelles etfahuleux metaux , treated fraud on the European side, 238--49, us well as tilt: impact of American treasure on seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe, 218-549.
• 
Because of so man}' mi ssi ng ledgers, th is is a t be st a ver)' tentative rate.
sh ort-te rm lap ses; but, on eac h occasion, withi n a few years or at most a decade, the downturn was halted and growth res umed . T he Mexican curve also falls in to three periods of varyi ng length s: 1559-1627, 1628-1724, a nd 1725-1809. Inthe fir st phase, which coinc ided with its earliest d iscove ries, Mexico posted a growth of 2.5 percen t per year. A ltho ugh the first p hase peaked in the 1620s, it may ha ve begun to leve l o ff at the turn of the seventeenth ce n tu r y, as was also true in Peru. Dow nward pressure on the p roduction curve is evident in the 1630s and I 640s, but it does not signal a prolonged depression. During the century-long second phase, wh ile suffer ing some pe riodi c reverses, the Mexican silve r ind ustry still posted a yearly growth o f 1.2 percent. 10 During the last decade of' th e seventeenth century, a new record h igh was ac hieved, the first since th e 16205. In the final p hase, p ro duction grew at a rate no less than 1.2 percent each year an d perhaps 
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II The discrepancy a rises because total production based o n s ilve r-la x rec eipts (From TePaske) is lower and th e growth rate slower th an output based o n mint registrati ons (fro m Humboldt). Wh en mine rs were gra nte d ta x e xemptions, the taxes at the tr easury wo uld be a ffec ted (reduced ) wh ereas the rcgistra tious at th e mint wo u ld not. O ther p roblems such as cu rr ency devaluat ions an d bookkeeping erro rs may a ffe ct bo th total silver tax es and to tal mint registrations.
12 Peter J. Bake well, Min ers of the Red M ountain: Ind ian Labor in Potosi, 1545 -1 650 (Albuq ue rq ue. N . Mex., 1984 . 32. A simila r sta te me nt app ea rs in his " Min ing in Colonial Sp ani sh Am e rica," 2 : 144 .
7.40
as h igh as 1.4 percent.i! At the end of the e ighteenth century, the expansion may have begun to slow as it had d one off a nd on during the ce ntur y, alth o u g h to what extent r emains unclear.
How can we account for the different curves in Peru and Mexico? Peter J.
Bakewell, who has stud ied camps in both Peru and Mexico, a r gued that Pe ru 's seventeenth-century depression was largel y the result o f "a r e depletion (and the con sequent extra costs o f new e xploratio n a nd more difficult e xtraction) ."12 The decline in the quantity and th e quality of are affected production in b oth col onies but probably more so in Peru than in Mexico. In either pl ace, are deple tion , Richard L. Gamel" translated into greater risks and higher costs for miners and investors. By the eighteenth century, a unit of Peruvian ore may have cost on average from 10 to 20 percent more to extract and process than a similar unit in Mexico.! ' ' Ifa Mexican mineowner could expect a 10 percent profit on 1,000 ounces, a Peruvian rnineowner could at best expect revenues just to cover expenses .
A second difference can be attributed to generally higher operational costs in Peru than in Mexico, in part because the Crown had long taxed more heavily in Peru. Mineowners paid a variety of royalties, fees, and taxes; in addition, they had to buy mercury, powder, salt, and other items from the governmentat fixed prices. In 1504, the Crown decreed that all mineowners should pay at least one-fifth of their silver (quinto Teal) for the privilege of mining it. In 1548, Mexico won a concession from the Crown by which the fifth was dropped to a tenth (diezmo), and by the seventeenth century the tenth had become the standard. In Peru, however, the fifth remained in effect (with a Few exceptions) until 1736, when the tenth was authorized.>' Thus, for more than half of the colonial period, Andean mineowners paid twice the royalty that Mexicans did . Mercury also represented another major government-imposed expense. On average, rnineowners (or refiners) expected a quintal (100 pounds) of mercury to produce 100 marks (800 ounces) of refined silver. The higher tbe yield per quintal, the lower the cost of refining to the producer. Peruvians paid a higher price than Mexicans for their mercury and obtained less silver per quintal because both their silver and mercury were of lower grades. While in Mexico all the government-related costs (from the pit to the mint) may have added up to about 20 percent of the value of the silver, in Peru they may have reached as high as 35 percent. Since these amounted to fixed costs over which the individual producer had little control, they could only be compensated for through better quality ores or greater operational efficiencies, which were harder to come by in Peru than in Mexico, at least after 1600.
A third explanation for why the Peruvian and Mexican curves differ has to do with how the mining industry developed in each viceroyalty. In Peru, the mountain ofsilver at Potosi was so rich that it dominated Andean mining until the first decade of the nineteenth century. Although other camps opened up in the seventeenth century, they were not as rich as Potosi, and they had trouble competing with Potosi for the limited capital and labor resources of the Andean economy . At least until the early eighteenth century and perhaps as late as the viceregal reorganization in 1778, the viceregal production curve largely reflected what was happening at Potosi. When production at Potosi fell off sharply during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, other camps had not developed sufficiently to compensate.t? For example, Oruro, founded in 1606 about 150 miles northwest of Potosi, enjoyed a promising start in the first quarter of the seventeenth century and a brief revival in the eighteenth century, but for the colonial period as a whole its ,.
curve was downward , Mining opportunities did im prove in the eighteenth century because the general Andean economy was on the upswing (even Potosi was expanding), and the Crown had reduced its share of the producers' costs, Pasco, a camp founded in 1630 more than 800 miles north of Potosi (in what was known as Lower Peru), produced little silver until the second half of the eighteenth century, when it eventually matched Potosi. To be sure, Mexico lacked a Potosi, but from the late sixteenth through the seventeenth century it could boast the : ; .:
.: existence of a half-dozen major camps, All these camps experienced the normal cycles of boom and bust, yet they often engineered recoveries that transformed contractions into expansions, The data that exist for individual districts and for the colony as a whole point to long-term growth rather than decline, In the eighteenth century, output from six of Mexico's major mining districts (that is, groups of mining camps served by a single branch of the royal treasury) grew in the range of 0.3 to 2.8 percent yearly: San Luis Potosi, 2,8 percent; Sombrerete, 2.4 percent; Guanajuato, 1.8 percent; Durango, 0,7 percent; Guadalajara, 0,5 percent; and Zacatecas, 0,3 percent. Since the cycles varied from camp to camp, a contraction in one or two large camps was offset (beyond the near term) by continuing or expanding production at other camps, Over the long run, then, as recovery followed recovery from camp to camp, the Mexican silver curve could maintain its upward movement. '" Fisher, Silver Mines and Sillier , \; l illers, [6] [7] Tcf'aske and Klein , "Seventeenth-Century Crisis ill New Spain ," 124-28; and Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure," 163 . Potosi's producti on curve d oes not harmonize with its le gend of weal th a nd fame, fo r th e tr end over the who le co lo n ial period is unmistakably downward (Figure 4 ) . Irs curve ros e sha r p ly until the first quarter of the seven teen th century, after which it began a slid e that did not e nd until th e middle of th e eighteenth century. A late colo n ial upswing was sustained through the se con d and third quarters o f the eighteen th ce n tu ry , a fte r which it began to weak en . By th e end of colonial ru le, output had sunk to level s comparable to th ose recorded during the n adir of its depression. For the whole colon ial period, g rowth was negativ e at an annu al r ate of between 0.3 a nd 0.4 percent.
Potosi's producti on cu rve reveals a pattern of growth (1549-1605), d ecline (1606-1723), revival (1724-1783), and finall y decline (17 84-1810 (Madrid, 194fi) , 27 1-72. y ci"iod was Poto si's most spectacular, when production grew at just under 3
annually. This growth rate should not disguise that Potosi's initial J cai' s were less than auspicious. Between] 549 and 1572, Potosi's output climbed to 3.2 million pesos and then dropped to 1 million pesos per year. The decline from the rapid depletion of rich, surface ores that were mined mostly by Indians under contract to the Spanish . To exploit underground ores required , lec? nical expertise that Indians lacked.! ? Mining did not long remain in a , .moribund state or, for that matter, in the hands of the Indians. Two events around 1572paved the way for Potosi's emergence as the premier camp. First, the govern men t established the mila system that was designed to assure Potosi an adequate supply of cheap labor, and , second, the local industry introduced the 'amalgamation process that was developed in Mexico to refine low-grade ores , , ' . economically. To refine the ore by amalgamating it with mercury and other ,"oillgredients required a substantial investment in plants and equipment. Only the S'!Jal1ish could affo r d these investments, and consequently they came to assume a : d6ininant role in both extracting and refining ores. Much of the initial capital investedin the refining operations came from processing the tailings piled around mineentrances. Those piles co n ta ined ores too poor to be sm e lte d but rich e n o ug h to be amalgamated, and since the extraction costs of these discarded ores had already been paid for , according to Bakewell, the huge profits that they brought illcould be used to pay off the loans needed to build the plants as well as to repair "alld expand the mines.v" In response to these changes, output rose from less than 1million pesos in 1572 to 7.5 million pesos in 1592, an all-time record . Between 1593 and the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century, when the boom came to an end , production was still very high but no longer rising. ' " During the second period, which encompasses most of the seventeenth century and the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Potosi's output shrank atan annual , rate of between 1 and 2 percent. From 1610 (when the boom began to fade) . ' through 1735 , th e decline was 1.4 percent per year, and from 1650 (when the . decline became unmistakable) through 1735, it was 1.6 percent per year. Despite .efforts toward and predictions of a recovery in seventeenth-century Potosi, that recovery ne ver materialized. The mountain that rose above the ca m p and city .contained four main veins that ran "more or less south to north verticall y on the "e astern flank ."21 The early miners dug awa y the top of the mountain, but, as later miners worked their way down, they had to find a way to extract the ore from the ,.interior, During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as m any as nine : horizontal r.unnels-six feet high and eight feet wide-were cut into the mountain to reach the ore and to d rain the water. The governmen t placed a limit on the size " of each mine along a vein, with the result that an unusually rich vein could have :severa l dozen mines (one allegedl y had seventy-eight different mines) . In 1640, at R ichard L. Garner least one tunnel re ached 400 ya r ds into the interior, and by 181 0 ano ther o ne had reached 2 ,200 yards a t a cost of 560,000 pesos. The owners of th e mines a nd the tunnels we re often different persons , a nd co nflicts inevitably arose over who s hou ld pay and how mu ch sh ould be p aid to m aintain th e tunnels. In short, as miners worked their wa y through and down the mounta in, th e cos t of cutting tunnels and draining mines in cr ea sed sh a r p ly.V The long se venteenth-century d ownward trend at Potosi is symptomatic of the effect of mounting costs and d eclining gr ades, a com bi nation th at few mineo wn ers were prepa red or qu alified to deal with. What kept Potosi's silver registrations fr om tumbling furth er and faster in th e se venteenth cen tu r y was the foundin g of n ew ca m ps such as Sicasica (1600), T'ata si (1612) , and Padua (16 52 ) within the Poto si di strict but be yond th e city itself. In the last half o f th e sev enteenth ce n tu r y, these other ca m ps may ha ve provided as much as one-quarter of th e silver registe red at Potosi. Even so , th at left Potosian mines with an annual avera ge output worth about 1.9 mill ion pesos. 23 The dilemma for th e industry and the government was real. Potosi still produced far m ore silver than a ny other cam p but at a cost that was growing and e rod ing profits. In the early se ve n teen th century, profits from mining at Potosi helped to fin an ce a general economic e xp ansion ; in th e lat e seventeenth ce ntu ry, as profits dwindled, Potosi ma y have become more of a burden than a benefit for the general eco nomy . To sus tain or to cu r ta il minin g at Potosi entailed difficult ch o ices for ind ustry and gov ernment, but to let economics dictate Potosi's fu tu re was probabl y never a practical alternative, a t lea st, not fOI' the Crown . Re covery, not abandonm ent, remained the goa l for Potosi. Potosi experienced a m odest ris e in output in the late third and ea rly fourth quarters of th e seven teen th ce n tu ry , a fte r whi ch it e n te red a half-century o f plummeting silver production. For 1690-1699, Potosi 's output (for the wh ole di strict) dropped by 26 .1 percent, for 1700-1710 by 30 percent, and for 1710-1 71 9 b y 23 .2 percent. In th e 1720s, whe n Potosi's producti on reac hed its n adir, a n n ua l ou tpu t averaged only 1.3 million [res os, the lowest sin ce th e mid-sixteenth centu ry. When a r ecovery a t Potosi fin ally to ok h old in the late 1720s or earl y 17 30s , th e upward clim b proceeded at a snail's p ace co m pa red to th e leap forward in the second half of the sixteenth cen tu ry. If dated fr om 1724, when the depression bottomed out, throu gh 1783 , the recovery had an a nnual growth rate of 1.8 percent. The strongest d ecades were the 1750s and the 17705, when ou tput sho t up by o n e-th ir d a n d o ne-fift h , respectively. The re covery lost mom entum in th e two or three decades be fore 1810, as production peaked in the 17805 a n d then turned down in the 1790s . Output was as high in th e last quarter of the eigh teen th century as a t a ny tim e sin ce th e middle o f th e sev e ntee n th centur y, but it was still only h alf of what it had been at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of th e se ve n tee n th ce n tu ry. The surge in output came largely in response to long-overdue reforms th at lowered operating costs th rough cuts in silver tax es a n d mercury prices. Additional savings accrued to the owners because with the . continuation of the mita they could pay draft laborers less than voluntary workers.v-As the prospect for making a profit improved at Potosi, the expansion
there had a wicler impact by stimulating business activity, capital investment, and r local growth across the Andean region . 2 5 Without Potosi's eighteenth-century . revival, both the mining economy and the general economy might have remained .. stalled down to the end of the colonial period or, at the very least, until the reorganization of the viceroyalty in 1778. Even in its twilight, Potosi's role, .••.. . although diminished, was crucial.
Zacatecas followed a different path . Although it suffered numerous setbacks for · many of the same reasons that Potosi did, the mine industry there managed to . avoid a long-term slump and instead put together a series of recoveries that resulted in an overall upward slanting production curve ( Figure 5 ). To be sure,
. compared to Potosi, Zacatecas was only a minor player on the silver stage. In the .1580s, when Potosi was at its zenith, it registered seven times as much silver as Zacatecas, and in the first decade of the nineteenth century, when Zacatecas's ..production broke all previous records, it was still not producing much more than · Potosi, whose output by then was about a million pesos below its colonial average. In the sixteenth century, despite major discoveries at Zacatecas, Durango, and -Parrill in the northern provinces of Mexico, the mining boom was more directly linked to discoveries in Taxco and Pachuca, camps not far from the capital, where _. their silver was registered and taxed.w In the 1580s and 1590s, more than half of . all silver-tax receipts were collected in Mexico City, an indication that the central . region was more productive than the northern provinces during the late sixteenth · ·. century. By the early seventeenth century, the shift from the center to the north · '; vas irreversibly underway.?? During the eighteenth century, the core of the -: · <Mexican silver industry was found in the area that extended from Guanajuato north to Zacatecas and from Guadalajara east to San Luis Potosi. Zacatecas's production curve is both different from Potosi's and more compli-· cated to describe. From 1559 to 1810, Zacatecas's rate of growth was 0.3 percent per year. 2R Along with this rising curve, however, Zacatecan mining had a highly :.. .26 There was no standard or uniform size for mining districts and their realcs cajas . Some districts · encompassed hundreds of square miles, and others were small and compact. It was even possible to :.register silver in a real caja outside the district in which the silver was mined. Still, the differences in "their registrations cannot be explained in terms of the differences in their jurisdictions.
· 27 Peter]. Bakewell, "Notes on the Mexican Silver Mining Industry in the 1590s," Humanitas, 19 JI978): 384, 400 ; and TePaske and Klein , "Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain," 124-25. <:: 26 When silver taxes instead of silver marks are used, tile rates are a few tenths of a percentlower per year. Data on silver taxes begin in 1580, but data on silver marks sta rt in 1559. For the discussion :<ifZacatccas's production curve, I have used growth rates calculated from silver marks, although I have converted marks to pesos. For silver taxes, consult TePaske and Klein, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis in NCII 'Spain ," 124-28; andJohnJ. TePaske, "Economic Cycles ," Bibliotheca Ameriama, 1 (1983) : 198-203, -For silver marks, 1560-J 700, see Bakewell , Silver Miniug and Society 24 1-45; silver marks. 1700-1821,
... were co mpiled fr om th e Clements Lib rar y, U niversity o f Michi g an , Zacatecas Collection : Qu ill.lo y diezmo, 170 0-14.171 6-29 , 1734 , 1738 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, 1736 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, -37, 1750 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, -62, 1769 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, , :-c •. 1771 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, -72,1774 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, ,1776 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, -78,1780 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, -82, 1784 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, -87,1790 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, -93,1799 Cargo yM.la, 17 30-34, ,1801 ; a nd Treasury Record s and Co rres po nd e nce, \71 5. For years not in the Cle me nts Library, consult Archive General d e 1nd ias (he rea fte r , AGI) , Guad alajara, leg. 477 , 478, 48 0, a nd 482. 29 If growth rates a re calc ula ted for the o bvio us rises and decl ine s, the results are: 155 9-75, 2.7 percent; \576-98 , -l.0 pe rcent; \ 599-1 622, 3.5 percent; 1623-61, -2.1 percent; 1662-80,7. 3 percent; 1681-98, -2.4 percent (94 percent confidence level); 1699-1724 , 3.4 percent; 172 5-6 3 , -2 .1 pe rcent ; 1764-1 8 JO, 2 A percent.
;) 0 Under this sch eme, the pe ak tha t can be id en tifie d d uri ng the 1670s m ust be tr eated as a temporary ab e rration . A maj or strike was m ade in the ca m p of So rnb rcr ere ab out th at time. Until a br anch o f the treasury was set up th ere in 1681 , Sombre rete's silver was presented for ta xation at Zacate cas. For a few yea rs, this arra ngeme nt infl ated Zacate cas's silver registrat ion s. Such re organizations LOok place throughout th e colonial peri od and co uld n ot help but affect th e silver c u rves o f individu al camps.
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FrGURE 5: Total Zacatecas Silver Production 1559-1810 cyclical character. .Fig ure 5 illustrates the difficulty that one faces in trying to analyze the production trend.?" Generally, output tended to rise for fifty to sixty years , after which declined for twenty to forty years. The dates for th e cycles are 1559-1664 with die boom ending a rou nd 1622, 1665-1763 with the boom beginning to fade about 1716, and 1764 to 1810 or
The long cycles are o f interest be cause, a t the end of the first century of mining in Zacatecas and again ..
at the end of the second century , output had dropped to or below the level for the .'.. initial year, 1559. Not only did Zacatecas recover from each downturn but it also .,, : raised production during the next long cycle . In the first century, output averaged . . about 1.2 million pesos per year, and during the second that average rose to about ' 1.5 million pesos per year, a change of23 .2 percent. The third cycle, of course, must t ' remain incomplete because of the independence movement, but the cycle 's growth phase up to 1810 or even up to 1821 is indisputable. In the boom phase third cycle, output reached an average annual level of about 2.2 million pesos, but if a contraction had followed the boom, the figure would surely be lower.
The pattern of development in early Zacatecas was similar to the pattern in early . Potosi. Zacatecas fell into a slump after the easily accessible ores had been extracted and processed. The introduction of refining with mercury effectively ended the , slump and began a boom that peaked in the early 1620s, a decade or so after Potosi .. had peaked a nd turned downward.e' The contraction that encompasses the second quarter of the seventeenth century and half of the third quarter is significant, although it did not turn into a prolonged depression, When Francisco de Rojas y Onate, a senior officer of Mexico City 'S high court of justice, the .Audi encia, visited Zacatecas in 1644, he discovered how bleak the prospects were
. for a quick revival of the local industry. He found the local mining economy in disarray: ab andoned mines, scarcities oflabor and mercury, and owners so deeply · in debt that few could maintain or expand their operations.w With many of Zacatecas's mines now fifty to one hundred years old , they had reached the stage . at which, without expensive repairs, they had become unprofitable.
• : Despite all these problems, Zacatecas did eventually recover. Rising costs and " sagging profits did not discourage a new group of owners and investors from .undertaking the repairs. Growth resumed, although it was highly volatile and <erratic. Output as measured in Figure 5 appears to skyrocket in the 1670s and the early l680s and th en to plummet in the late 1680s and the 1690s before rising again .after 1700, in large part, because high-grade silver was discovered in Sombrerete (one hundred miles north) but registered in Zacatecas until a separate real caja was , opened in Sombrerete in 1681 . Hence this sharp rise followed by an equally sharp "' decline has more to do with administrative changes than mining operations . If .Sombrerete's silver could be factored out, Zacatecas's curve would be less extreme. "Itwould probably show a rise in output at Zacatecas during the 1660s and the 1670s followed by a downward movement through the 1690s before recovery at the ' .' beginning of the eighteenth century . Of the nearly 20 million pesos registered in Zacatecas during the 1670s, under 10 million pesos came fr om Sombrerete. That would make Zacatecas's share more than 10 million pesos, an amount that was :higher than the ou tput of the cam p during the 1660s. Indeed, Zacatecas's recovery :, :was strong enough to prompt from the leader of the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia -in 1681 a statement that both camps were prospering. 
Garn er e igh tee n th century, as a result of these periodic recapitalization efforts, Zacatecas was riding the crest of another su ccessful re covery that finally peaked in the mid-1720s, sixty years after the last major co n trac tio n . During th e next forty years (in to th e early 1760s), however, output shrank until all the gains of the previou s boom had been lost. Many heavily capitalized . mines co u ld not be operated profitably and were aban d o n ed in the 1740s and 1750s. The decline in o u tp u t was so g r ea t that b y 1760 the number of refineries needed to process th e ore had dropped from about thirty to six. 3 4
The third cycle began in the 1760s when a new ge ne ra tio n of miners with th eir merch ant backers started to claim and to rehabilitate many of the camp's a ba n d on ed mines. Especially impressive was a fifteen-year period (1764-177 9) when th eir efforts, Sll pported by th e Bourbon mining reforms, resulted in a vir tual quadrupling o f output (at an annual rate just over 9 percent). O ver the final thirty ye a rs before Hidalgo'S Reb ellion , although o u tp u t fluctu ated , it even tu all y broke all previous records. The n ew highs in th e ea rl y 1800s were prec eded, however, by a mercury shortage (1798-1801) that caused the curve to dip to n ear-record lows . 3 5 By th e eighteenth ce n tu ry , ore yield s in Spanish American mining were no hi gher o n ave r age th an one to two ounces of silver per hundredweight of ore. 36 This meant that Andean min ers had to process several tim es more ore to achieve the same yields as Mexican miners. Zacatecas's yields of two to three ounce s of silver per hundredweight of ore, enough to m ake but not to guarantee a profit, were close to the Mexican average; Potosi's yields o f one ounce or less were also probably close to the Andean average ."? Some camps did better than Zac atecas a nd some worse th an P otosi. Understanding how silver mining in Spanish America accommodated itself to these conditions re quires a closer e xa m inatio n o f the industr y's str u ct u re .
SILVER MININ G WAS A S P E C IAL C O LON IAL BU SiNESS i N THAT ALL T H E P RODU CT,
bullion, was turned into currency, except for the sm all am ount that jewelers and artisans needed for their work. The government d etermined how man y co in s co uld be cu t from a bar of silver, and the coins entered th e general economy as the owner of the silver used th em to cover tax es , wages , supplies, or loans. Not all th e cu rrency entered th e economy, of co u rse, fo r a su bsta n tial part (perhaps more th an half) paid for imports and various gov ernmental transfers. As in any other business venture, to st ay in busines s, silve r producers had to r eceive e no ugh curre ncy from their bullion to cover costs a n d provide a retu rn o n capital th at justified further investment in the operation. Co st s were dependent o n wh at :1·, Cl ements Library, Zacat ecas Collectio n , Treasu r y Record s and Co rrespond en ce, 1760-69, Bo x A.
3 " Garn e r, "Silve r Produ ction and Ent re prene u ria l St r uct u re ," 179-85 . , 1984) .5 a n d n. 4 . :17 Ta n d eter, "Fo rced arid Fr ee Labour in Lat e Colonial Potosi," 100 , n. 4 . Ca lcu lat io ns fo r Zacat eca s a re d eri ved fr om yield s quoted in se ve ral docum en ts. AGI , Guadalaja ra, leg. 192 ; a nd Archivo Ge nera l d e la Naci6n (h e r eafter, AG N), Miner/a, leg. 4 .
3G Enriqu e T a ndete r. T raba] o[ orzad o y tm bajo fibre en cl P otosi coloni al tardio (Buen o s Aires
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producers had to pay for labor and material, on the efficiency of the operation, .. . and the quality of the are . Silver producers had no direct control over the quality of the ore in the ground , but they could try to compensate for less than average grades by being more efficient, at least in theory. Although the break-even point in terms of ore quality varied from camp to camp and from period to period, it ranged from 40 to 60 ounces of silver per ton of ore refined with mercury. The quality of ore declined during the colonial era, yet rich lodes remained to .. be discovered and exploited even in established camps. Predicting yields of silver ... from are in flooded and abandoned works was a favorite pastime of owners and investors, and many of these predictions were duly reported in mining surveys conducted by royal officials. In Zacatecas, for example, during the contraction of · the 17405, a survey reported that a group of flooded and largely abandoned mines, . .•. . if recovered, would yield from 80 to 160 ounces of silver per ton of are, estimates
• that were considerably higher than the average.e'' When one of those mines, ... Quebradilla, was finally recovered by Jose de la Borda late in the third quarter of .
• .
•.
•. the eighteenth century, the yields, although high by colonial standards, were less ... than half those predicted a half-century earlier.w On average, a ton of Andean ore .. yieldedless silver than a comparable ton of ore in Mexico, and Peru's miners had to do more to cut costs or to introduce efficiencies in order to offset the lower < quality. But the two major imports, mercury and labor, usually cost more in Peru · than Mexico, and Andean miners were no more efficient and may well have been lessefficient than Mexican miners. While one part of the history ofSpanish colonial · mining is the long-term success in Mexico, another part is the long-term effort to . support a more marginal Peruvian industry.
Without the invention of the amalgamation process and the mercury that the '. process required, few Spanish-American camps could have stayed in business very .. : long. Once mercury's importance was established in the second half of the sixteenth century, the Crown moved to create a monopoly to control the production, sale, and distribution of mercury in the viceroyalties. How well the .. monopoly functioned remains a matter of debate, although most historians agree . . that the high prices and undependable supplies hardly served the interests of the : producers. The mineowners believed that lower prices and larger stockpiles of : mercury would possibly increase the production of silver enough to make up for : . . ••. the loss of income from the mercury, and such growth would benefit equally the Crown and the industry.w For the Crown, however, the monopoly functioned not . . . only to protect a valuable commodity but also to generate revenue for the government. Although from time to time the government acceded to requests for ·· lower mercury prices or other changes in the administration of the monopoly, it · always had to weigh these actions against the conflicting needs of the ind ustry for .... lower costs and the state for greater revenues. Disbanding the monopoly as some, Guadalajara, leg. 190 
R ichard L. Garne r
like Alexander von Humboldt, a sta un ch free tr ad er, had urged wa s probabl y to o r isky fin a nciall y fo r th e Crown to co ns ider seriously.s ' Year-to-year short ages o f m ercury in individu al camps or fo r e ntire co lo n ies were f requent a nd probabl y unavoidable , given the gre a t di st an ces of mercury mi nes fr om th e silver ca m ps a nd a p rim itive tran s po rtation sys te m . While a su d de n dro p in the mercury su pply could cu rt ail production almost immediately, a rise in su p p lies did not n ecess aril y mea n a n in crease in output of silve r, at leas t in th e short te r m. Oth er fac tors , such as th e q u ality o f o re, th e cos t of drainin g and open ing new tunnels, and th e avail ability of labor an d capital, had to be taken into acc ou n t -b efore o pe ratio ns co u ld be ex panded to ma tc h the su p ply of m ercury. vVe d o not ye t k now h o w m uc h m e rcury was m in ed in or shi p p ed to Span ish Am e r ica. A m ercury ca m p, o pe ned a t Huancavelica in Peru du ring the six teen th cen tury, was to serve Po tos i, wh ile m in es in Spain and Eu rope we re to su p p ly Mexico a nd a n y ad d itio nal a mo unt that was need ed in Pe ru. The o pe ra tio n a nd ad m in istra tio n o f th e government-owned m ines wer e often inefficient a nd in e p t. Despite th ese proble ms, the volu me of m ercu r y a vaila ble f o r distr ib utio n in Pe ru a nd Mexico dou b led fr o m the seve nteenth to the eighteenth ce n t ury . With the qual ity of ore on the decli n e, su ch an in crea se was req ui red to su p po rt th e expansion of minin g d u ring the ei ghteenth cent ury .t ?
The p roductio n of mercu r y at Huancaveli ca ca n be r eco nstru cted fo r two periods, 1571 -1 724 and 1759-1 81 2 (F igu re 6):1:\ D urin g th ese two pe rio ds, Huanca veli ca 's p roducti on was at least 950,000 quintales, a n d , if th e figure s fo r th e se cond q uar te r of the e ig h tee n th ce ntury we re known a n d in cluded , it wo u ld p roba bly reach 1.1 mill ion quintales. A rule -of-th u mb meas ure fo r silve r to mercu r y was 100 m arks o f silve r p er one hundred pounds of me r cury. The ratio of Potosi silve r to I-Iuancaveli ca merc u ry (ass u m ing th at a ll of Hu ancavelica 's m e rcury was sh ip ped to Poto si) is ab o u t 97 m a rk s for each on e hu ndred p all nd s. H uau cav elica 's cu r ve h as a slight downward tilt during th e co lonial per iod: H I-I uan r.avelica's m e rcu r y prod uc tio n d eclin ed mo re slo wly th an Po tosi 's silve r p rod uctio n , a n d th is suggests that th e su p p ly of mercu r y was n ot a crucial facto r in causin g or sustaining th e long de p ressio n at Potosi. For sho rter inte rvals, to be su re , a d eclin e in th e su p p ly of m ercu ry could ha ve a n adverse impact o n t he silver curve . O n th e viceregal level, however, Potosi's mo no poly over Huancavelica's m ercury may well .1-1 For 15 71-1724, the rat e is negat ive a t 0.2 perce lll pe r year with a co nfid e nce leve l or 70 pe rcent , a nd fo r 175 9-181 2, it is negat i ve a t 1.8 percc nt per rcar with a 100 p ercent confidence level.
• •
• 1571 1600 1650 1700 1750 1812 YEARS T he crucial lin kage between m e rcu r y and silve r is e vident when th e growth rates I fo r merc ury supply and silver p rod uctio n are co mpared: mercury grew at an annual ra te of 0.8 pe rcent fro m 1559 to 1805 , silver at 1 pe rcent. Mexico's yearly ' 5 Yearl y mercury data fo r 15:'9-1 7 00 are drawn from Chaunu and Cha unu, 
-.
• totals of silver production include smelted silver, whi ch by th e late eighteenth century amounted to less than 20 percent and perhaps no more than 10 percent of total silver regi strations. Until the eighteenth cen tu ry, silver registrations grew nearly twice as fast as mercury imports, a sign of a rough parity between sm elted silver, which d id n ot require mercury, and refined silver. In the eighteenth century, however, silver a nd mercury grew a t abo u t the same rates, because more ore was being refined and less smelted. Mexico may have received as m any as 1.7 million quintales of mercury between the middle of the sixteenth century a n d 1810. At 100 marks per quintal, Mexico produced ab ou t 1.4 billion pesos worth of refined silver in a total of 1.8 billion pesos of refined and smelted silver. More important th an the ratio between refined and smelted silve r is the fa ct that the yield of silver to mercury st abilized at a level that could yield a profit. In several major ca mps, the yield m ay h ave improved to 110 or 125 marks per quintal during the second half of the eighteenth century.sv Mexico's mercury curve, like Hu ancavelica's . (
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curve, rose sharply in the last half of the sixteenth century in response to the · introduction of the mercury process that made refining low-grade ore economical. . . . .... . The volume of mercury shipped to Mexico fell modestly in the seventeenth · century and then rose markedly in the eighteenth century. The decline in mercury • shipments coincided with the rise (also modest) in silver registrations. These •contradictory trends could coexist in the seventeenth century but not in the ' .. eighteenth century, when smelting became less profitable. Miners also had other , .·ways to deal with mercury shortages: they could try to save mercury by using less ,·,' :·".·.c' iJ-' :""""" " or recapturing more of what they did use, and they could try to supplement their >:: supply by buying mercury from merchants and dealers outside the royal .
• monopoly."? In retrospect, one could argue that increasing the supply of mercury · during the seventeenth century (especially at the prevailing prices) would not have ' .: permanently reversed the downward trend in Peru, and adding to the supply of .
• mercury would probably have strengthened the upward trend in Mexico.
What the Crown did in the seventeenth century, however, was the reverse: it increased the supply in Peru by shipping less to Mexico. Beginning in the 1620s ' . and continuing into the 1650s, large quantities of mercury from Almaden and " . Idria were shipped to Peru instead of Mexico with the result that Mexico's supply , ·shrank. This decision may well have been a miscalculation that contributed to a .. . ... slump in Mexican mining during the second quarter of the seventeenth century. ' . Tables 1 and 2 show that the amount of mercury available in Spanish America ' . (from all sources-Almaden, ldria, and Huancavelica) fell in the period .. 1630-1670 from more than 100,000 quintales to just slightly more than 60,000 · quintales. During the second and third quarters, Peru had two and a halftimes more mercury than Mexico. With less total mercury available, Mexican miners and .' refiners had to make choices about curtailing operations, firing up the smelters, :o r stretching supplies. Mexican miners were largely successful in making the ..' necessary adjustments because, although the supply of mercury in Mexico did not . ' .. · grow and may have fallen during the second half of the seventeenth century, the : output of silver began to rise again. On the Peruvian side, the need for mercury ".may have been legitimate. The decline in Peru's total registrations (starting about ' ) 610) eased in the second quarter, after which came a brief recovery before the final descent. That the recovery was only temporary was not so apparent to the . government, which still regarded Peru's mines and particularly Potosi's as the :. colonies' most valuable mining properties. By the 1660s, however, the govern-"" .ment, recognizing the need to accommodate the demand for mercury in Mexico, · reversed its priorities. At a time when Almaden failed to boost its output, the ' , ·.govern me nt authorized the shipment of mercury from Huacavelica in Peru to -Mexico to supplement the supply of mercury in Mexico, although only a few thousand quintales of Peruvian mercury were actually delivered.ss During the course of the eighteenth ce n tu ry , Almaden (and Idria) became the chief source of mercury for both Mexico an d Peru. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Huancavelica probably supplied less than h alf of what the Andean miners required on average each year to maintain or expand their operations . In that period. H uan cavelica's mercury production was falling a t ab out the sa m e r ate that Peru's silver output was rising, so the gap between what was needed a nd wh at was locally available was widening.s? The difference was m ade up through imports. During the last h alf of the eighteenth century and the first 49 Fisher provided data on Huancavelica' s output from 1759 to 1812 in Silver Min es and Silucr Mi ners, 76. decade of the nineteenth century, a total of 200,000 quiutales or more of mercury arrived from Europe. To su p p ly Peru with several thousand quintales a year and with 10,000 to 20,000 qunuales meant that Almaden (and ldria) had La produce annually from 15,000 to 25,000 quintales. With such heavy dependence :, .(m imports, and given the perils and delays of the Almaden operations and the .:Atlantic crossings, shortages were bound to occur. But there were no long-term shortages in either Peru or Mexico, and, at times, such as the 1790s, the supply .of' . mercury was ample. In the Viceroyalty of Peru (formerly Lower Peru), the , treasury had 11,000 quintales on hand in 1790 and received 40,000 quintales -, through 1797 from Huancavelica and Almaden. Even after this abundance of . mercury sparked an explosion in output that totaled more than 30 million pesos, 01'4.5 million pesos per year, the treasury still had in 1797 a balance ofabout 16,000 : : 'quintales, enough mercury for approximately two years.e? Similarly, in Mexico • during the 1790s, when its silver refineries were consuming 20,000 to 25,000
.qilinlales per year, Mexican imports were not only keeping pace but were also . providing year-end balances of 15,000 to 25 ,000 quintales, enough for at least a .· Y ear's operation ."! Still, the mer'Cllry supply system was vulnerable. When the j" .; ' -. :.:British blockade of the Spanish peninsula was in effect from 1798 through 1801) : :the How of mercury from Sp ain to the New World slowed to a trickle, with the consequence that silver output in Spanish America dropped by more than a third. 52 Although surpluses existed in both Peru and Mexico, they were quickly drawn down during the shortage and not rebuilt after imports resumed in 1802. Supply was only part of the mercury equation, however. Peruvians paid more for mercury than Mexicans, and, since they normally had lower yields, they had a harder time, no matter the level of supply, making a profit. Without a downward adjustment in mercury prices and other financial incentives, expanding mercury supplies would have contributed little to the long-term gTowth and development of the Peruvian silver industry. The price of mercury actually moved downward during colonial times, but it did so slowly and to the advantage of the Crown. 5 3 As a general rule, mercury prices were lower in Mexico than in Peru even though the Mexican price started at a higher level than Peru's. In Mexico, prices dropped from 180 pesos per quintal to 82.5 pesos in the early seventeenth century and then to 41 pesos in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In Peru, the price of mercury from Huancavelica was set at 104 pesos per quintal in the late sixteenth century, and for the last half of the colonial period prices fluctuated between the high 90s and the low 70s per quintal, although miners lacking capital might pay the equivalent of 100 pesos per quintal to their creditors (aviadores). In 1809, Peru's price dropped to 50 pesos per quintal, the lowest official price ever. Almaden mercury, which Peru came to depend on more and more ill the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was normally set at a price that reflected the cost of operating the mine at Huancavelica, As a result, Andean miners paid about twice the price that Mexican miners paid for Almaden mercury (in part, to cover higher transportation expenses), despite repeated requests by the Peruvians to be granted the same price that Mexicans paid . 5 4 Higher mercury prices translated into higher mining costs at a time when the ore yielded on average no more than the customary ratio of 100 marks of silver per quintal of mercury and may have fallen below that level.',5 Mercury was the single most expensive item in the refining operation . In Mexico, after the final price reduction in 1778, Almaden mercury accounted for one-fifth of the total refining costs, and Idria mercury, used when none other was available, accounted for one-quarter of those costs. r" In Peru, one-third or more of the total refining costs went for mercury. Peruvian producers had to find a way of raising yields or streamlining operations to make up for higher mercury costs. Neither was easy, Siluer Mine" and S ilver Miners, [81] [82] [83] [84] . In 1800, the price of Peruvian mercury was raised from 73 LO 85 peso", per quintal. in order to stimulate production at HuancaveJica and reduce demand for Almaden mercury during the British blockade (81-82). The purchaser usually paid the co st of transporting the mercury from a central war ehouse to the mining camp . But the cost of transponing the mercury ov ersea s was included in the price fix ed by the monopoly.
,,5 Fisher, Silver Mines and Silver Miners, 74 . Mexico, 1763 -1810 (Cambridge, 1971 , 152-56; and Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure. " 177, n. 58 . In that footnote, gross profits sho u ld read 4-20 percellL instead of 20-40 percent.
5(\ David Brading, Miners andMerchants in Bourb on
• j .« 
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and, becau se o f the thin profit m a rgins, the producers often h ad to buy m e rcury with cash borrowed fr om aviadores or on credi t from the local treasu r y. A viadores added a stee p ch a rge for ad va nci ng ca sh , while the treasury, with a growing portfolio of un paid m ercury debts, co u ld refuse credit or co n fisca te silve r or o t he r property until a ll indebted n ess was remo ved .e? Price, m o re th an su p ply, worked against a profitable industry over the long term.
AMO NG T H E M OST C OST L Y ITEMS FOR PERUVI
A N AN D M EXICA N MI NEO'WNERS were wages and sala r ies . The y constituted a larger part of the total co st in the extractin g than in the refining of th e o re . H ow mu ch a silve r p ro d uce r h ad to p ay in wa ges and salaries (either in ca sh or kind ) had a major impact o n the profitability o f the operatio n . In th e first decad es after the major silve r dis cov eries, draft labor had to be used in both Pe ru and Mexico. In the late sixteenth a nd ea rl y seventeenth centuries, volu n ta ry labor began to suppleme nt draft labo r but did not co m ple tely replace it. Peru's draft-labor system (mila) remained in e ffect at both Potosi a n d Hu an cav elica u ntil th e e nd of the co lo n ial peri od, alth o u g h the m ajority of Peru's workers were hired r ather than drafted .e" Some hi storians have argued that the continued re lia nce on the mila system, even for a minority of th e laborers, b ecame an obstacle to the development of mining in Pe ru bec ause it disgu ised what would have be en the r e al labor cos ts if th e draftees had been hired a t p r ev ailin g r ates.?? But o thers hav e argued that it wa s precisely the high cost of mining in Potosi (an d in Huancaveli ca) that led both the mineowne r s and the public officials to d efend continuation of the mila. Without it, many mines would not h ave sho wn a ny profit, even af te r the Crow n cu t silver ta xes a nd mercu ry prices in th e ei gh teenth centu ry , and the tr easu r y would have lost revenue.t'? No Sp anish institution provoked as much co nd e m na tio n as the draft-labor system-mila in Peru an d repartim ieruo in Mexico-because of its cruel and ex plo itative ch aracter. But d iffering eco no m ic conditions may ex p lain why Pe ru 's syst em no t onl y su r vived b u t e volv ed while Mexico's virtu a lly di sappeared.
Find ing e no ugh workers fo r the wid el y sca tte red an d remotel y located ca m ps was diffcult at a n y tim e, and labor shortages, especially under the pressure of Indian depopulation in th e sixteenth a nd ea rly seventeenth ce ntu r ies, were un avoidabl e. B y 1600, the co lo n ial mining in dustry needed between 20,000 a n d 25,000 wo rke rs , a nu mbe r that was g re a ter than co u ld be su p plie d through Bra d ing a nd Cross, "Colon ial Silver Mining," 579. GU Tandetc r, "F orced and Free Labour in Late Co lon ia l Potosi," 100-04. 110-17. Ce rt ainl y, Br ading and Cross ra ised the sa me issue wh en the y wro te th at , "wit hout th is so urc e o f c heap lab or the cerro rico . with a ll its rich ores long sin ce exhau sted, co uld not ha ve co ntinu ed to work miner als wh ich on ave rage yielded lI0 more th an 3/4 o unces o f silver per hu ndredwei ght," in "Coloni al Sil ver Min ing ," 56 0. See also Co le's co nclud ing cha pter th at in co rp orates T a nde rer's study in The Potosi Mita, voluntary labor."! In 1600, Peru and Mexico had about the same proportion (half and half) of draft and voluntary laborers.v-After J650, labor shortages moderated as the colonial population began to grow, but they remained a factor in Peru because its population was smaller and grew more slowly.v?
The institutionalization of the mita in Peru extends beyond the sim p le demographic issues. The mila was o r ga n ized in the 1570s to provide a pool of about .)
13,500 workers at Potosi, o f whi ch only one-third were supposed to be working in any given week. 1600, the camp needed 11,000 to J2 ,000 workers, and the difference between what the mita provided and what the camp needed was made up by min-gas, workers hired from among the "off-duty" mitayos and other Indians in search of work. Thus, within a quarter of a century of the founding of thernita, min-gas, many of whom may have come to Potosi under the mila, outnumbered rnilayos three to one. Both government and industry expressed a preference for hiring workers rather than drafting them, but their overall concern was not just having enough workers but having enough at a reasonable wage. Since mitoses were paid less than min-gas, the continuation of labor drafts had a strong financial incentive. The insistence on preservation or expansion of the mila at th e same time that the number of mingus was growing was derived in part from an effort to control labor costs.s-Without the mila, Potosi would have had trouble attracting workers under the wages and conditions thatmitayos had to accept, and many mineowners would have had trouble staying in business. The mila did supply a scarce commodity at a bargain price on a temporary basis, but, equally important, it served as a source for the hiring of permanent workers at higher wages than mitayo s earned though not as high perhaps as a free market would have dictated.
With mine labor frequently in short supply, Potosian miners learned quickly how to buy, sell, lease, and swap labor d espite the state's persistent efforts to regulate and alloca te the supply. Potosi's labor market became a hybrid . It was shaped but not dominated by either the coercive or the voluntary system . The market sh owed itself to be remarkably inventive and constantly ch anging even as Potosi moved from expansion to contraction . In one arrangement, some miners sold or leased the services of their assigned mitayos to other producers rather than use them in their own operations ; in another, which became popular , some communities, unable to meet their quotas, negotiated with owners to substitute cash payments for drafted workers, the cash to be used, presumably, to hire 6 1 Bakewell, "Mining in Col onial Sp anish America," 2: 127-28.
Bakewell, Mine·rsof the Red Mountain , 111-13, 185-86. In Th e Potosi Mita , 56 . Cole estimated thai the ratio o f one drafted worker to one voluntary laborer was maintained during the seventeenth century at man y small o pe rations, and he also dis cu ssed (48-50) how competition fo r draft lab or intensified because th e number willing o r able to work as mitnyo» was dwinclling. Although draft lab or was used in ca m ps besides Pot osi, su ch as Oruro, a nd in farming and manufacturin g, it did not bec ome such a n integral part of these local a nd region al economic developments as it did in P OLOSI. For furth er comments on the labor force within the general demographic history, see Noble David Cook . Demographic Collapse: Indian Peru, 1520-1620 (Ca m br id ge , 198]); and Nicolas Sanchez-Albovnoz's Indios y tributes (m el Alto Pen t (Lima, 1980) . 60' As late as the eighteenth century, epidemics and famin es could induce temporar y labor shortages with attend ant declines in silver registrations in Mexico (1737, 1760, 1779, a nd 1784), but they were generally manageable. Garner. "Silver Production and En tre p re ne urial Structure." M Cole , Tit l' Pofos[ Alita, 51-52 . " ..
.:repl acements.s" Trading in mitayos apparently grew as mining costs rose and profits • . . . plummeted during the first half of the seventeenth century. Holders of mitayos p aid -... . them 2.5 to 3.5 reales per day, but they could earn several times that amount by : selling or leasing their services. The buyer probably paid no more than the prevailing rate in the open market, and the mitayo, regardless of his employer, received no more than the mita-prescribed wage. For the seller, trading in mitayos · could bring more profit than operating the mine or refinery to which the mitayos ·were assigned. The government estimated that a single mitayo could fetch 235 pesos a year. If the services of a third or a half of the several thousand mitayos on duty in Potosi were sold or leased for the period of one year, those transactions would : . generate between a quarter and a half-million pesos for the original holders of the " Iabor obligations.v" The cash-substitution plan followed two basic forms. Indian .' communities could hire and pay substitute workers (usually mingas) or transfer the money for them directly to the mineowners, Either way, the miners could shift a : percentage of their operational costs to the Indian communities without having to : share any of the savings or profits with them. In an unexpected (and illegal) twist, ':' t he miners, who received cash in lieu of workers, could opt to pocket the money .". \ ",. ·rather than use it to hire replacements, hence the phrase indios de faltriquera, or Indians in the pocket. From time to time, royal officials reported that only .. ' one-third or one-half of the mitayos actually showed up to work in Potosi, the rest having been paid for in cash. As much as a million pesoscould flow from the Indian communities to the Potosi miners each year, although such an amount must be treated as the exception rather than the rule.s? In 1659, one royal inquiry turned up the fact that the delivery of silver in place of workers amounted to 580,000 pesos,
:afigure said to be much higher than what the treasury collected in silver taxes.
.. Some cash was used to hire mingas, and some was certainly pocketed, but the exact division was seldom documented. Despite much criticism on economic, adminis-.·t rative , and moral grounds, the mita survived because it evolved from a short-term . labor-supply system into a financial service that helped to subsidize Potosi's miners ' as mining itself grew more costly and less profitable. The selling or leasing of 1IIitayo services was more -.. complex and subtle th an the above description suggests. In one case, Bakewell explained that refinery . owners piled lip mercury d ebts with the tr ea sury in order to win approval to lease their plants a nd the · 1IIilayos assigned to them because they could make more money from th e leases than from the refineries.
Both the treasury and the camp could be losers, though, when the former was saddled with large debts and the lau er with ineffi cient opera tor s.
c.:. 6 7 The figure was arrived at by assum ing that th ere were approx imately 3,000 mitayos on duty in ". Potosi each year in th e seventeenth century a nd by multiplying th e annual wages of the local mingas · . (7 to 9 pesos per week, or 400 to 425 pesosper year) times one-half to two-thirds of th e mitayo population . .B akewell, Miners oj the Red M ountain , J61-62 .
. '
68 Cole, The PotosiMila , 92 . Cole 's source, a report by Francisco de la Cruz, the bishop-elect of Santa · 'Man a, sta ted that the royal fifth at Potosi was ani}' 300,000 pesos in 1659 . Bakewell and Larnbcrto de :' .Sierra showed silver registrations that should have yielded ta xes in the range of 600,000 to 700,000 :' .pesos, but 'TePaske and Klein showed silver revenues at Potosi of a bo ut 500 ,000 pesos . This di scr epancy raises the possibil ity th at, if de la Cruz's figure for th e roy al fifth is ina ccurate, his estimate of the mila · deliveries could also be suspect. It is often difficult to reco ncile several set s of figures, su ch as silver · marks versus silver revenues, in any given year.
In the eighteenth century, economic forces combined to resuscitate the mita at Potosi and to lead some to call for it to be extended beyond Potosi. The forces at work were a revival in mining, spurred in part by cuts in silver taxes and mercury prices, and a scarcity of labor. The underlying cause of the labor shortage in the Andean camps was the slow rate of the population growth, although some regions posted greater gains than others.P" The Spanish also believed that Indians would not work in the mines unless "forced " to do so, which in a sense was true; many Indians refused to work because they had other job choices."? The imbalance between the supply of and demand for labor boosted wages and costs. In Potosi, a high-cost and low-profit camp to begin with, mila labor was one way to cut expenses in order to raise profits, since muasos were paid less than free laborers. During the seventeenth century, the number of all workers needed annually in Potosi had fallen from 10,000 to 4,000. The number of mitayos had declined as well and may have dropped even further in the first quarter of the eighteenth century."! After the revival began in 1720s and 1730s, the demand for labor surely rose. For the end of the eighteenth century, when Potosi's mining was on the wane again, Enrique Tandeter reported that the camp had about 5,000 laborers of whom just under half (2,376) were milayos. As in the past, mitayos held the least desirable jobs, such as hauling and grinding are, jobs that could not be easily or cheaply filled by wage labor. Potosian rnineowners had long tried to exact more work from the mitasos than the regulations permitted (another way of getting more output for the daily wage). In the eighteenth century, some of the regulations were rewritten so that the milayo's daily quotas (thirty bags of are instead of fifteen, for example) increased, while his wages did not. Milayos had to work longer hours and enlist family members to fulfill their obligations, all of this at no higher cost to the owner. The difference between what mitayos were paid and what mingas had to be paid ended up as miners' profits. The continuation of mila labor and the revision of its work rules may have contributed substantially to Potosi's recovery in the second half of the eighteenth century, although this remains to be spelled out in detail. In short, mining became profitable once again at the expense of the Indian communities that had long subsidized the mila systern.t?
By the late eighteenth century, Upper Peru and Potosi had been attached to the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, but mila quotas earlier defined for Potosi remained in force for certain provinces in the newly reorganized Viceroyalty of Peru (Lower Peru). Apart from the financial gain through the continued use of the mila, the need for labor may have been as real in Upper Peru as it was becoming in Lower Peru, especially at Pasco, the viceroyalty's premier camp. Moreover, Indians in Lower Peru were disinclined to seek or to accept work in the mining camps, and miners, expressing their exasperation , often demanded labor drafts to relieve 69 Marcel Haitin, "Prices, the Lima Market, and the Agricultural Crisis of the Late Eighteenth Century in Peru ," Jall1-buch fur Geschicht e . . . Lateinamerihas, 22 (1985) : 187-88. 70 Fisher, Silver Mines and Silver Miners, 90. 71 Cole, The Potosi Mila , 120 . 72 Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosi," 100-04, I 10-17; Bakewell, Miners of the Red Mountain, 153-55; a n d Cole, The Potosi Mila, 28-32, 123-36. .,
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". shortages and moderate wages. Some "voluntary" drafts were permitted but were .< seldom successful. At Pasco, the shortages were so severe and constant that workers ' .' could earn as much as 3 jJesos a day, a wage that was several times higher than what miners thought that they should pay 01" could afford. Competition for workers ·even led to poaching, which the government tried to ban.7 3 . In the long and controversial history of the mila, certain developments make : some economic sense. Bakewell argued, correctly I believe, that, despite the -r»:.•"."·'·,'.,···· .: protestations of royal officials and later historians, the selling and "pocketing" of . .mila services could be economically useful because they introduced a degree of <flexibility into a system whose quotas were normally revised each decade.r-But, as PotOSI slid more deeply into a mining depression, that economic rationale •... became less valid because sustaining the industry rather than shifting the labor of that industry was the chief concern. The delivery of mitayos whether in person or •. . .. in silver became a way to help to keep Potosi's financially beleaguered miners in '. business, a goal, it should be stressed, that the Crown often shared.ts If wages had .' . been allowed to rise to reflect the imbalance in supply and demand, many Potosian mines would have gone bankrupt, with losses not only to the industry but to the Crown as well. Subsidies were preferable to abandonments, even though the miners had to mount active campaigns to persuade increasingly skeptical viceroys . that the mila in various forms had to be preserved . The miners lost a few battlesperiodically, the Crown approved reforms-but won the war because, as Potosi's production turned upward in the 1730s, the mila both provided scarce labor and subsidized costly operations. Its survival was assured until the end of the colonial period.
Although the mila endured in Andean mining until independence, its Mexican counterpart, ropartimiento, did not survive the seventeenth century.tv The question that needs to be raised, even though we may not be able to answer it yet, is whether the emergence of free labor in Mexico contributed positively to the development of the mining industry in contrast to the dual system of free and forced labor in i ·:· ..· Peru. That Mexico's population was larger, may have recovered more quickly in .! ' the seventeenth century, and was located closer to the major mining centers than Peru's were distinct advantages. It may be equally significant that, as the silver industry took root and the employment regimen took shape, no single Mexican camp had a demand for labor comparable to Potosi's. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when the pressure of Indian mortality was the heaviest, draft and slave labor were used primarily to alleviate local shortages. David Brading and Harry Cross cited the example of Pachuca, which drafted 1, 108 Indians from surrounding villages during 1576-1579 but only . 57 by 1661. 77 According to a survey of the industry in the 1590s, the number of mine workers Richard L. Gamer had reached over 9,000 for the whole colony (compared to more than 10,000 in the single camp of Potosi in Peru); of the 9,000,68.5 percent were naborias, or free Indian workers, 17.7 percent were repartimiento Indians, and 13.8 were slaves . Naborias tended to be concentrated in the north, where the natives were less populous and repartimiento labor in the central areas, where the natives were more numerous. Because northern miners lacked access to the Indian communities in the central areas, the probable location of the colony's major boom in the late sixteenth century, they had to find other ways (slavery, wages, or peonage) to bring workers to their camps. Had northern Mexico, where the population was small and scattered, sprouted a Potosi, the colony would probably have created a draft-labor system. By the time the mining industry had shifted from the center to the north, a wage-labor system was already in place. Although never widespread in the northern camps, repartimiento did on occasion account for a third of the workers in Zacatecas, which had become the colony's premier camp.t"
During the Indian depopulation from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century, competition for labor in Mexico could be intense. Three strikes-two in the 1630s and one in the 1650s-at Parra1 may have severely depleted the pool of workers in Zacatecas and other nearby camps. Many mestizos and mulattos, who were often the skilled workers, migrated to Parral because their skills commanded a higher wage there than in Zacatecas.?? An intermediate form of labor between the compulsory and voluntary systems was peonage, which Indians accepted to earn money for tribute and other obligations. In Zacatecas, Bakewell found instances in which money may have been advanced, although he could not always ascertain whether this was done to attract or retain the workers. It was Widespread enough to cause the viceregal government to issue rules limiting the time of indebtedness, usually four to eight months. No doubt peonage inspired abuse but not uniformly so. Many workers had no debts, and many others may have been influenced to stay whether in debt or not because of the attractiveness of the wage, the pepena (worker's are allotment), and the general living conditions. so Despite the falling population, Bakewell concluded that the terms of employment often played a larger role in creating labor shortages than did the demographic factors . In his view, "the availability of Indian labour [in Zacatecas] depended on the prosperity of mining, [rather] than the prosperity of mining on the availability of labour."Hl Periodic labor shortages and the absence of a large-scale, state-run labor system notwithstanding, wages for Mexican mine and refinery workers do not appear to have been as high as or higher than wages for voluntary laborers in Peru. Comparing wages of mine workers within the same colony or between two colonies is risky because the evidence is scant and because wages were paid in cash, in kind, 76 Bakewell , Silver "Notes o n Mexican Mining, and , "lin . ' "' ..
(," .
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. . in ore sha res , o r in co m bina tions o f all th ree. Du rin g the seven te en th a n d i': . eighteenth ce ntu rie s, Mexican workers were p aid, o n a weekl y basis, between 2 and . . .. 4/lesos, a wage th at, if paid in cash, was more than the a verage mitaso receiv ed but not as mu ch as th e a verageminga received in Peru . An arran gement for a sha re of the or e (called bo th pepena and partido) co uld earn th e worker two to th ree tim es .... .. his wage . No t all ca tego ries of mine or refin e ry workers qualified for a re shares, and the rates vari ed fr om ca m p to ca m p a nd from mine to mine .s" Al thou gh the . . flcpenas mad e m in e a nd refine ry wo rkers Me xico 's hi ghest paid workers in a n .... indu str y in which labor accounted fo r better th an h alf of the total prod uction cos ts, .. it did not become over th e long te r m a p rohibitive financial burd en. Future . research may show wh ether tyin g wo rkers' wages to pepenas made th e lab or fo rce m ore efficient and productive than relying solely o n wage s. B3 In th e eighteenth century, some mi ners complained th at high labor costs , in particular, the pepenas, · · in combina tio n with risin g cos ts fo r repairs and expansions, rendered m in in g less and Jess profitable " Some mine a nd refinery owne rs su cceeded in reducing lab or · · : C05ts, altho ug h th e y were grea tly aided in this by population gro wth th at in creased . the com petition a m o ng the workers for the j obs.84 I n general, th e cost of labor to . the emp loyer o n a daily or wee kly basis held stead y a nd may have eve n decreased in eightee n th-ce n tu ry Me xico , whil e it edged up in Peru.
·· PERU's LOWER OR E Q U ALI TIES AND HIGH ER MER C URY A N D LAB OR COST S mad e
.Iong-ter m finan cing less a tt ractive there th an in Me xico a n d f u rt he r hand icapped the Andean silve r industry. Clearly, th e trends, whether or not investors full y compreh end ed their sign ifica nce, fa vored a m ore cautious approach in Peru. Since the early seve n teen th century, th e main source of ca p ita l fo r mining had been th e merchant community. Merchants could become involved in different wa ys: they . could ad vance cas h or cred it (ao ios) to pa y for wage s and su pplies; they cou ld . >tmderwrite the cost of building ad its and shafts, repairing tunnels, and erecting . refineries; and th e y could purchase shares o r partn erships in mini ng ccmpa nies .e> Ex tending au ios was wid ely practi ced in both colo nies . It en ta iled the least risk over the shortest time fo r th e m erchant, sin ce he o ffered au ios only to producers who : agreed to sell th eir refined silve r to him . T he merchant-a.viador paid less fo r th e silver than th e min t did a nd cons id e re d th e difference as his p ro fit o r co m m ission. "tn Mexico, howe ver, finan cial a rra ngem e n ts be twee n producers a n d merchants evolved beyo nd auios . In addition , we must re cogni ze th at the lon g mining 'wSfm ill,l771 -1 77 9 (Au stin. T ex., 1961). 177-78; and Bradi ng. M iners and M erchants, 147-49, 184, . 186, 193, 199, 201 ,204 ,277-78 . T he re is little evide nc e tha t a system of pepenas to su ppleme n t wages .developed in Peru, alth ough in th e lat e eig h tee n th ce nt ury some min ers began to o ffe r a share of o re in order 10 attrac t ne w wor kers. Fisher, S iluer Mines and Si lver Miners, 94 .
. ss As Bakewell, Bradin g, a nd Fis her have a ll poin ted out, th ere we re r isks, in th at worke rs tried to reserve the bes t ores for th emselves an d m igh t resort to cutting o ut the pillars (which su pported th e 'roofs) in orde r 10 ge t ores. 
Richm'd L. Gamer
depression had reduced Peru's capital resources (for mineowners and merchants alike) and limited its economic growth . Peruvian merchants may have more readily accepted long-term risks in th e flush times of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries than later. In the former period, merchants allowed miners to r oll over their loans at increasingly higher interest rates. The worsening depression mad e that practice less popular.w Conversel y, expansion in Mexico had replenished the capital pool and en h a nced business in ge ner al. Mexican investors exhibited an entrepreneurial spirit, which Peruvians as late as the 1790s complained that Peruvian investors lacked: "The Kingdom of Mexico h as always prospered on accou n t of its Mines: Peru, whose mines are richer and more numerous, is barely kept alive by hers . This contrast arises so lely from differing a ttitud es towards Mining in the two countries. There a rich merchant will advance 50,000 or 100,000 pesosfor the workingof a Mine, simply on the word of the Miner, and remain unmoved when he learns that the vein has been lost: here there is hardly an habiluador [backer] wh o advances 10 ,000 or 12,000 pesos (if, indeed, any provide so large a sum) without seeking to squeeze the Miner and his Mines until he has the pina [silver not yet cast into bars] in his hand, and his profit is thus assu red. " 8 7 Les s is known about how mining was organized and financed in Peru than in Mexico. It is plausible that, after the installation of th e amalgamation process in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the structure o f the viceregal mining industries followed different patterns: the scale of Peru's mining and refining operations be came smaller as Mexico's became larger. A single comparison from the late eighteenth century is instructive but not definitive. For (Lower) Peru , John Fish er estimated th at the average mine employed under twenty workers, while Pasco, its largest camp, had about thirty . No colony-wide ratio for late co lo n ial Me xico exists yet. In Zacatecas, however, the avera ge was fifty wo rkers per mine. Pasco and Zacatecas h ad almost the same number of workers (2,500 ve r sus 2,700), but productivity was higher in Zacatecas, with 40 percent fewer mines that ave rag ed two to three times more silver than Pasco. Hil One result of the increasing participation of Mexico's merchant community was th e establishment of many large, heavily capitalized , and vertically organized mining companies .v? Mexican producers and investors h ad discovered the benefits of large-scale operations perhaps as ea rly as the secon d half of the seventeenth century, whereas Peruvians had initiated few such operations by the late eighteenth century. The remarkable entrepreneur Lopez de Quiroga was an exception to the long-term 86 Andrien , Crisis and Decline, [32] [33] From M ercurio Pcruano , 3 (j anuary 9 , 1791) : 2 1-22 , quoted in Fish er, Silver M in cs a nd Si lv er M iners, ·98 ; also see Fisher, "Min in g and the Peruvian Econom y," 52 . 88 Fisher sta ted in " Min in g and the Pe ruvian Econom y," 52, that "ab out a d ozen " employees made up the average work force . 1n his Silver Min es and. Silver Miners, 95, the ratio of mine worker s to productive mines in 1799 is between sixteen and seventee n to o ne . For Zacatecas, a list of mines and the n u mber o f workers pe r mine for 17 80 
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Peruvian pa tte rn. Potosi had had o th e r wealthy miners, such as Hernan Carrillo '. de Cordova and Pedro d e Mondra gon, but th e y were beneficiaries by a nd large r · oE. the origina l Potosian bo om during th e lat e fift eenth and early sixt eenth 'centuries, wh en the processing o f the tailings was so profitable. Acco rd in g to Bakewell, while these a nd other Potosians exhibited capitalistic traits, L6pez de QUiroga re presented a "new phenomenon," "the first capitalistic m iner" in Potosi
.andperhaps in Spanish Ame rica. H is wealth ma y ha ve grown to tens of millions :' of pesos over the course of his ca reer in mining, co m merce , and r anching. W h at . Set Lopez de Quiroga a pa rt from o th e r min ers of his and e a rlie r g' enerations was the scale of his operation a n d the ex te n t of hi s success at a time of fe w investments 'and nu me ro us bankruptcie s at Potos i. He po ssessed e no r m o us ca pi tal resources ' . with which h e built a hu ge enterprise o f mines , refineries, an d the businesses th at the prod ucts needed to ke ep the mines and refineries operating. With ;his knack for finding ways to strea mline his ope rations a nd in crease his profits, h e .:' , r roved to be a n able a nd effective manager of a n ext ensive fin ancial e rnp ire.v? " l mpressive as his achi evements we r e , L6pez d e Quiroga did not become the model · . JO Tother Potosian or Peruvian miners. Continued reliance by most o n short-term :al1ios both refl ected and 're in for ced the development of small-scale operations.
During th e last quarter of the e igh tee n th ce n tury, Pasco's succ ess as a minin g ::Center was in part the result of a d eparture fr om the avios system. Silve r was fir st discovered in Pasco around 1567 . Production data, based o n treasu ry receipts, exist only fr o ni the] 67 0s to the end o f the colo n ia l period . After posting figu r es · in the ran ge of 500 to 1,000 m arks per yea r during th e last qu arter of th e : seventeen th ce n tu r y, o u tp u t began to grow in the early eighteenth ce n tu r y.v' In the early e ighteenth ce n tur y, few of Pasco's pits exceeded "30 varas [yards] in depth." The presence of underground springs a n d the lack of drain age facilities .: made th e m in es prone to flo oding a n d costl y to o pe rate. It was not until the middle . of the eighteenth centu ry that an ad it for d r ain age wa s in stalled so th at miners , could mov e beyond the water lin e. By the last quarter of the eighteenth century , .Pasco mine rs faced once aga in the n eed to construct a ne w drainage syste m, which in 1780 so me fift y miners agreed to sup port. Fisher r eported th at th e " n e w ores <were not exce p tio nally rich, but [were] plentiful," pl entiful enough , it would ". appear, to persuade the miners in 1794 to build a larger ad it. Miners in Pasco had known of the ne ed for ad its to drain the mi nes sin ce the seven teen th ce ntu ry , and .: the technolog y was fai r ly well und erstood. Several ' projects for building or . .'. enlarging adi ts were u ndertaken a t Pasco, with some su ccess between 1750 and . . ... . 1850, but, because they were so cos tly, they were seldom finished o n time or as .
• designed . Suc h projects required a level of fina nc in g th at few Peruvian miners .. individually co u ld afford a nd, in th e absence of mercantile ca p ita l, Pasco min ers . pooled th eir fun d s or tapped revenues available through the miners' to build. ' .' the adits. From time to time, they h ad access to ch ea p Indian labor (with offi cial ap proval), which kept cos ts down . Large import-export m e rchants, who co u ld ?" Late eig h tee n th -ce nt ur y Peru was not as poor as it had been a ce n tu ry ea rlie r, a nd yet Lima m erchants, who were among Peru's wealthiest, co n tin ued to plead insufficient fund s ar ising in lar ge part, th ey a rgue d, from losses incurred in the di smantling o f th e commerci al monopoly. Amo ng the merchants th emselv es, cr itics char ge d their colleagues with being p rovincial and inept in adapting to the changing commercial eco no my. It is little won de r th at they fo u n d investment in m ining so d aunting. With out the broad particip ation of the colon y's principal moneylenders, min ing in Pe ru (in co m pa r iso n to 'Mexico) was, acco rdi ng to Fish er, organized and fin anced as a "subsistence activity."u?' In Me xico , silver ent repreneurs began to tap merch ant ca p ita l fo r both . ,
long-term a nd short-term ventures in th e seventeenth ce n tu r y, and th ey co n tin ued borrowing o n an e ven g re a te r scal e in th e eighteenth century. Although auios rema in ed the co n ventional fin an cial mechanism, the m erchant's r ole grew as produ ction inc r eased. In contra st to Peru ,joint ventures between me rchants and min ers became commonplace. In the early eig htee n th centu ry. Za catecan m inin g m erchants j oined miners as partners in enterprises , so m e of which were fo rmed to rehabilitate bu t not to ope ra te the mines, while o the rs were Formed to d o both .
In th e second half o f the e igh te e nt h ce ntu ry , m erch ants and min ers formed co m pa n ies in whi ch sh ares of stoc ks were issued a nd profits distributed. Zacatecas's Vetagrande Company was o r ga n ized in the cady 1780s and spent nea rl y 1.2 million pesos ov er th e ne xt twenty years before striking it rich. Brading d escribed its sto ckholde rs as a "small group of Mexico C ity merch ant-ca pit alists a n d fin anc e hou ses which had d ominated e n tire sections of the minin g industry throughout the eigh teen th century." The co m pa ny had trouble paying its bills in so me yea rs, but it co nt in ue d to in vest in acq uiring, co nsolidating, an d r eha biji tati n g its properties until th e early 180 0s, wh en it yield ed divi d ends for th e remaining st oc kh old ers of more than 3 m illion pesos. 9 -1 Ca p ital was also raised in man y ways: from fa mily m embers, from religious orders, o r from the min ers' own r esou rces, but th e merchant as ama dor, rescatador (in de pe nd e n t refiner), p artner, or stockhold er rem ain ed th e primary so urce for ca pi ta l o r cred it. Za catecas, whi ch su ffered the lon gest slu m p of all the major distri cts durin g the e igh teen th century, co ntinued to att ra ct enough capital to ca rry o u t some large ve n tures , althou gh at tim es it need ed more th an it co u ld rai se . Quebl'adilla was co u n te d a mong Zac atecas's rich est mines, but it was onl y pr oduc tive for abo u t a d ozen yea rs between 1700 and 1810 . Still, at least three companies were organized to drain a nd repair th e m in e during th e mid-century slu m p (be fore J ose de la Bo rda successfully reh a bilitated th e min e in th e 1770 s). In a ll th es e ventures, wh ich lost 
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. "several hundreds of th ousands of pesos, m e rchants we re the principal underwrit-.ers. On e cou ld argue that, o n th e basis of th e roster of miners a nd r efiners in mid-eighteenth-cen tury Zac a tec as , th e number of m erchants exte ndin g loans a n d ··acquiring mines was g rowing r ather th an decreasing as the ca m p 's silver registrations contin ued to plummet. As ris ky as inv esting in Zacate cas m ay h ave been, it paid off for some, a n d th at was enough to encourage o th ers to tr y.g5 Mexico's silve r-p rod uc tio n curve m ade r isk-ta king mo re tol erabl e. The r ise in output over time mad e th e slumps and dep res sions, so me of consider abl e .magnitu de, a ppear le ss se ri o us a nd m ore m anageable. While m a ny mining o perations failed to ma ke an y p r ofits a n d probabl y bankru pted th eir ow n e rs a n d h ackers, eno ugh of th em su cceed ed to a d d to the colony's o verall we alth, '-: :particularly in the e ig hteen th ce ntu ry , wh en m erchan ts pou red ca pi ta l in to th e opening and re h a bilitatio n o f mines, not o nly in Zac atecas but also in Pach uca, .Bolanos, and Ca to rce . O n e ch a racter istic th at owners and ba ckers sh ared was a willingness to plow pro fits back into th e operations to m ake th em more e fficie nt and prod ucti ve. The rising silve r cu rve reinforced the expectation of succes s. An im portant. feature in the evolu tio n of the indu stry was th e e me rge nce o f more large-scale, e fficie nt, a n d ca p ita l-inte nsive co m pan ies. In seve n teen thcentur y Zacat ecas, ac co r d in g to Bakewell, Bartolome Bravo de Acuna fou nd a way ..... toc ombine o p era tio ns of four diff erent mines, and, as a result, he "improved th e mines by linkin g th em ... an d in due course he made a fortune from th ern."Y6 A half-century later, Pedro Sal azar, a n aoiador, won th e su p port of mineo wners who ". 1i r orked th e same vei n to crea te a fu nd by ass ess in g each o wner. The m o ney was used to repair a n d maintain the shaft and adit th at served all their und erground . workings. The plan co ntin ued in e ffec t fo r nearl y te n yea rs (17 15-172 5) , even though Salazar himself did not live to see it implem ented .?? This pattern 'Culminated with th e late eig h te en th -ce n tu ry min ing co m pany, which had mi n ers . and merc ha nts a mon g its stoc k ho ld e rs, wh ich wo r ked clu sters of mi nes al ong the .same veins, and which might e ven enjo y special co ncessions. vs O f course, Me xico still had wea k nesses a nd defects to o ve rcome . Ca pita l was sca rce a n d du ring the .last quarte r of th e e ig h teen th century a lmost co mplet ely d rie d up , as the Crown X"" ..
began to impleme nt an a ggressive policy o f "volu n ta r y donations" and forced .loans.v? The lo ng-t erm success of mining was crucial in thi s r egard , fo r while it consumed ca p ita l, it also ge ne rated capital. By contrast , Pe ru, except for the late ". "' Th e go vernme nt also had a rol e in te rms o f g ranting credit a nd exe mption s fr om ta xes fo r the '.purchase of mercury 1.0 h elp to stim u late in vestme nt by cu tt ing operating cost s. For a general disc ussio n ·o[ thc econom ic r ole of the eighteen th-cen tury Mexica n me rchant, see Richard L. Garner sixteenth and perhaps the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, was predominately a consumer of capital.
The role of the merchant, who controlled so much of the How and distribution of capital in Spanish America, differed sharply between the Andean and Mexican mining economies. The recovery of mining in eighteenth-century Peru as a result of new strikes and lower costs did not alleviate merchants' skepticism or fears to the extent that they changed their investment practices. In Mexico, on the other hand, the role of the merchant grew significantly in the eighteenth century. In 1761, Francisco Xavier Gamboa, an attorney for the Mexico City merchants' guild, published his famous Comentarios de las ordenamzas de minas. He painted, perhaps purposely, a bleak picture of the Mexican mining industry to show why the industry needed capital and how the joining of merchants and miners into a single organization would help to raise that capital and spur production. But the condition of the industry was not as bleak as Gamboa indicated . Production had been rising steadily since the seventeenth centu ry, and the downturn around 1760 was both temporary and selective. Gamboa and his merchant clients were interested in a revised legal code that would directly enhance the position of the merchant in the industry . His approach amounted to an endorsement of the industry's economic potential.tv? But Gamboa's proposal had little chance of succeeding in Mexico, where, despite the long-accepted role of the merchant in mining, fear of the total domination of the industry by the merchant guild remained strong. Given the attitude of Peru's merchants. it is hard to imagine such a plan ever being adopted there.
r HAVE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO TREAT THE FULL RANGE of topics that might be considered within a comparative framework for the mining economies of the two viceroyalties of Peru and Mexico. Rather, I have chosen to describe and analyze long-term production trends and growth rates as a first and necessary step to any full-scale comparative analysis. I have also tried to suggest the ways in which the three crucial factors of mercury, labor, and capital may have influenced the movement or the shape of the various silver curves. The production trends for total colonial output, total Peruvian output, and total Mexican output rose over the 250 years of rule by Spain in the New World. But the growth rates for the two viceroyalties, the principal components of total colonial production, were significantly different, and, while the long decline in the seventeenth century was largely the result of a plummeting trend in Peru, it was tempered by modest growth in the output of Mexico's mines . In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, as Peru's production continued to slide, Mexico became and remained the chief silver producer in the Spanish New World. In the eighteenth century, recovery and 100 Francisco Xavi er Gamboa, Comentarios de las ordenanzas de minas (Madrid, 1761), and Brading, Miners and. Merchants, . After the third-quarter boom was well underway. Gamboa pressed the Mexican viceroy, Antonio Bucareli, to reconsider the merchant-miner guild, which thc Crown had 1I0t yet approved (and did not ever approve). At this stage (with mining profits rising), the Consulado had even more reason to inv est in mining. Sterling Library, Yale University, Latin American Collection, E·G.
. eXYJ<\\15io\\ in th.e camps 01 P er u anc\ \ l exico cau':>ec\ to tal co\o nla\ outp u t to chrnb slowly but stead iry u n til uno. N ew discoveries h elped to b oost out pu t in the •• eighteenth ce n tur y, but m ore impressive was th e a p p lica uon of fmanci at and .. technical resources to permit rehabilitation o f many poorly maintained but st ill . . . ..potentially profitable mines in older camps.
Once Potosi's tail ings were exhausted, m ining costs be came generally higher in . Peru than in Mexico, a nd this diffe rence may e xplain wh y Peru's m in ing problems proved to be intractable. The great surge in production of silver at Potosi during the late sixteenth a n d early seventeenth centuries may have distorted th e vie w o f both the mining industry and the Cro wn as to wh at would ar rest a n d rev erse the seventeenth-century depression. Just as the surge in mining had enlarged the capital bas e o f the Andean eco nom y (or economies), the con tractio n sh ra nk it. Fo r more than a ce n tu ry, Peru lacked an engine to drive the econ omy. By contrast, in ... Mexico, silver min ing, whi ch became more broadly bas ed in ge ographic terms, grew over time , and in so doing it con tin ually replenished the capital pool that was .: ."".'Cl"jj'\,",.. :.;:. ·· needed in the mining sector and the general economy. The m ain engine of the . colonial economy slowed do wn and even went into revers e on occasion but neve r >f or extende d periods. The eigh te en th-ce n tu ry expa ns ion may h ave resulted from infusions of merch ant capital, as som e have argued, but .it was cap ital that was originally formed in the mining sec tor a nd th en recycled through the general ... economy. 
